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Abstract In order to investigate the interaction between tax policy, welfare bene-
fits, the government technology for monitoring and sanctioning inadequate search,
workfare, and externalities from work, we incorporate endogenous job search and
involuntary unemployment into a model of optimal nonlinear income taxation. In
this setting, the government faces a trade-off between boosting employment of low-
skilled agents and raising work effort of high-skilled workers. If sanctions for inade-
quate search effort can be targeted at high productivity types for whom it is socially
optimal to search, the government can afford to levy higher labor taxes on marginal
workers without discouraging these agents from seeking work. This allows for lower
marginal taxes on work effort of agents with a job. In contrast to workfare, job exter-
nalities in the private sector raise marginal tax rates, as the government attaches more
importance to boosting employment of low-skilled workers.
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1 Introduction
Policy makers are increasingly concerned about the adverse incentive effects of gen-
erous income support on job search. Indeed, unemployment imposes substantial so-
cial costs in terms of obsolescence of human capital and social skills. In response to
these concerns, many countries have cut taxes on unskilled work, while tightening
sanctions on inadequate efforts to find work. Moreover, as part of active labor-market
policies and ‘welfare-to-work’ programs, several governments have also introduced
workfare.
This paper investigates the interaction between tax policy, welfare benefits, sanc-
tions on inadequate search, workfare, and externalities from work. To that end, we
incorporate labor-market imperfections that induce governments to provide income
support to those without work (namely, search costs and involuntary unemployment)
into a model of optimal nonlinear income taxation. In the standard optimal tax model,
workers can adjust their labor supply only on the so-called intensive margin by alter-
ing hours of work. Empirical work, however, reveals that tax and benefit programs
cause low-skilled workers to adjust their labor supply not only on the intensive mar-
gin (i.e., marginally reducing or raising the hours they work in their jobs), but also
on the extensive margin (i.e., entering or leaving the labor force). By incorporating
search costs, we allow agents to adjust their labor supply on both these margins.
Within this setting, optimal unemployment is determined by the requirement that
distortions on the extensive margin balance those on the intensive margin. On the
one hand, generous in-work benefits help to alleviate distortions on the participation
margin by encouraging more low-skilled workers to actively look for work. On the
other hand, such benefits make it more attractive for high-ability agents to mimic
lower ability agents, thereby distorting work effort. Given an exogenous income level
provided to the poor without work, the government thus faces a trade-off between
boosting employment of low-skilled agents and raising work effort of higher skilled
workers. A positive implicit tax rate on the extensive margin distorting job search
is therefore the price for combatting poverty while protecting labor supply of higher
skilled workers.
This paper extends the analysis of Boone and Bovenberg (2004) in two directions.
First, it incorporates job externalities, workfare and a public monitoring technology
for the search effort and skill levels of the unemployed and explores how exogenous
changes in these new elements impact optimal policy and employment. As a second
extension, we allow the government to optimize over not only the tax system but also
welfare benefits.
Job externalities in the private sector cause the government to attach more im-
portance to reducing the tax wedge on the extensive margin. This results in more
progressive labor taxes as marginal taxes on the intensive margin are raised. At the
same time, welfare benefits paid to those out of work decline as in-work benefits
assume a larger role in alleviating poverty. Hence the recent popularity of Earned In-
come Tax Credits (EITC), which reduce average tax rates for low-skilled workers but
raise marginal tax rates in their phase-out range, can be explained by governments
putting more emphasis on the positive externalities for society of people working in
a job instead of receiving welfare benefits.
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If it can target sanctions for inadequate search effort at high productivity types
for whom it is socially optimal to search for work, the government can afford to
levy higher labor taxes on marginal workers without discouraging these agents from
seeking work and without hurting lower skilled agents. In this case, the government
in fact uses information about the skill levels of the unemployed to redistribute con-
sumption towards low-skilled agents with fewer distortions on the search margin. The
lower overall tax wedge on the search margin allows for a larger explicit tax wedge
on search and a smaller tax wedge on the intensive margin of labor supply. Accord-
ingly, active labor market policies designed to monitor unemployed workers’ search
behavior act as a substitute for an EITC as they allow the government to levy a higher
average tax on low skilled workers and reduce marginal taxes for the higher skills.
Similarly, if the sanctions for inadequate job search are accompanied by workfare,
the benefits of workfare (in terms of additional production and possibly job external-
ities) cause the government to attach less importance to stimulating employment in
the private sector and thus reduce the need to make the tax system more progressive.
Hence, in the same manner as sanctions aimed at high-skilled workers for whom
it is socially optimal to search, workfare is a substitute for the EITC. In particular,
it raises average tax rates on low-skilled workers while reducing marginal tax rates
facing higher skilled agents.
Also Saez (2002) incorporates the two labor-supply margins of not only hours
worked but also labor-force participation in an optimal income tax model. Our ap-
proach differs from that of Saez in two important respects. First of all, whereas Saez
assumes that all unemployed have voluntarily left the labor force, we account also for
involuntary unemployment. Agents thus face two risks: being born with low ability
and being involuntarily unemployed. More generally, we are more explicit than Saez
(2002) about the labor-market imperfections affecting the costs and effectiveness of
labor-market search, including the welfare implications of these imperfections. We
incorporate not only more labor-market imperfections (such as search costs and pos-
itive externalities of employment), but also additional government instruments, in-
cluding workfare and sanctions on inadequate search based on monitoring both search
effort and skill levels of the unemployed.
The second main difference is that Saez (2002) allows for more general prefer-
ences that are not necessarily quasi-linear in leisure. Whereas his results are thus
more general than ours, Saez assumes heterogeneous preferences and leaves im-
plicit the underlying social welfare function in the presence of these heterogeneous
preferences. Our specific assumptions on preferences enable us to derive more an-
alytical results on comparative statics with respect to labor-market imperfections
(such as the costs and effectiveness of search) and institutional features of the wel-
fare and monitoring system (such as workfare and the level and nature of sanctions
on inadequate search). This sheds additional light on the determinants of the op-
timal tax schedule. Indeed, a substantial literature (see, e.g., Boadway et al. 2000;
Ebert 1992; Weymark 1986, 1987, and Lollivier and Rochet 1983) has turned to
quasi-linear preferences in leisure in order to obtain more intuition for the determi-
nants of the optimal nonlinear income tax, as these preferences allow for closed-form
solutions of the standard optimal nonlinear income tax problem. Our quasi-linear
preferences also imply that a utilitarian government cares about the distribution of
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consumption rather than the distribution of work effort. Indeed, policy debates typi-
cally focus on raising consumption rather than reducing work effort of the poor.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. After Sect. 2 sets up the model,
Sect. 3 characterizes the solution and focuses on how the government trades off
distortions on the intensive and extensive margins. Section 4 shows that an EITC
becomes more attractive if the government attaches a higher social value to people
working in the private sector. The opposite happens if a government prefers workfare.
Section 5 concludes. All proofs of the results are in the Appendix.
2 The model
Agents exhibit homogenous preferences but heterogeneous skills. A worker featuring
ability n who provides y units of work effort supplies ny efficiency units of homo-
geneous labor. In the face of a fixed, unitary labor productivity, these efficiency units
are transformed in the same number of units of output. With output as the numeraire
and a competitive labor market, the before-tax wage per hour collected by a worker
is given by the exogenous skill level of that worker n. Hence, gross (i.e., before-tax)
labor income earned by a worker of skill n, z(n), amounts to z(n) = ny(n). The func-
tion f (n) denotes the density of agents of ability n, and F(n) represents the corre-
sponding cumulative distribution function. The support of the distribution of abilities
is given by [n0, n1], while f (·) is differentiable and satisfies 1 − n0f (n0) > 0. We
discuss the last condition below.
As in Lollivier and Rochet (1983), Weymark (1987), Ebert (1992), and Boadway
et al. (2000), workers share the following quasi-linear utility function over consump-
tion x ≥ 0 and work effort y ≥ 0
u(x, y) = v(x) − y,
where v(x) is increasing and strictly concave: v′(x) > 0, v′′(x) < 0 for all x ≥ 0. Fur-
thermore, v(0) = 0, limx↓0 v′(x) = ∞ and limx→+∞ v′(x) = 0. Since utility is linear
in work effort, consumption x is not affected by income effects, while a utilitarian
government cares only about aggregate work effort in the economy. The concavity
of v(·) implies that a utilitarian government wants to insure agents against the risk
of a low consumption level. Such a government thus aims at an equal distribution of
consumption rather than an equal distribution of work effort over the various agents.
Indeed, public policy typically focuses on raising consumption rather than reducing
work effort of the poor.
Agents can adjust their labor supply on not only the intensive margin (i.e., by
varying work effort y) but also the extensive margin (i.e., by deciding whether or not
to look for a job). In particular, by searching with intensity s ∈ [0,1], agents find a
job with probability s. Search costs γ (s) are given by
γ (s) =
{
γ s if s ∈ [0, s¯],
+∞ otherwise,
where (with a slight abuse of notation) γ ≥ 0 is a parameter representing the magni-
tude of the search costs. s¯ < 1 implies that agents can fail to find a job, even though
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they search at maximum capacity s¯. By modeling the costs and (in)effectiveness of
search, the parameters γ and (1− s¯) capture labor-market imperfections that give rise
to unemployment.1 As shown in (1) below, this search cost function implies a simple
discrete decision: either search (at full capacity) or do not search.
If an agent does not succeed in finding a job, (s)he receives a public welfare (or
social assistance) benefit b ≥ 0.2 The government imposes a sanction with exogenous
probability 0 < pc < 1 if an agent does not search at the maximum level s¯ while (s)he
is supposed to do so. The sanction reduces the agent’s utility by π > 0 in terms of
foregone leisure.3 The government cannot perfectly observe search effort. Accord-
ingly, agents who looked for a job at the maximum intensity s¯ but did not find one
and thus are involuntarily unemployed also face an exogenous probability ps (where
0 ≤ ps ≤ pc < 1) of being incorrectly sanctioned. We interpret ps > 0 as an exoge-
nous tagging error where the government misclassifies an involuntarily unemployed
agent as being voluntary unemployed.
An agent of ability n selects search intensity s to maximize expected utility
U(n) = max
s
{−γ (s) + su(n) + (1 − s)(v(b) − πp(s))},
where p(s) denotes the probability of suffering a sanction and u(n) stands for ex-post
utility (net of search costs) of a type n agent who has found a job. With the search
cost function γ (s) and the sanction system (i.e., p(s) = pc if s < s¯, and p(s) = ps if
s = s¯) introduced above, the optimal choice of s for type n amounts to
s(n) =
{




γ¯ ≡ γ − (pcπ − psπ(1 − s¯))/s¯.
A worker thus either does not search at all (and is thus voluntarily unemployed)
or searches at the maximum intensity s¯. Just as ps > 0, we can interpret 1 − pc >
0 as an exogenous tagging error where the government misclassifies a voluntarily
unemployed agent as being involuntarily unemployed.
We refer to the constraint u(n) ≥ γ¯ + v(b) as the participation or individual ra-
tionality constraint. We impose γ s¯ − (pcπ − psπ(1 − s¯)) > 0 so that γ¯ > 0. Hence,
although the government can observe search intensity to some extent, the sanction
1A special case of our model is a regular labor-supply model with fixed costs of work (such as child care
costs). In particular, in the absence of involuntary unemployment (i.e., s¯ = 1), the parameter γ can be
interpreted as these fixed costs of entering the labor market.
2We interpret b as a social assistance payment rather than an unemployment insurance benefit because b
does not depend on ability n.
3We are interested here in workfare and therefore consider a sanction in terms of foregone leisure. Al-
ternatively, one could consider a sanction in terms of a cut in welfare benefits. This would lead to similar
results, although the analysis would be more complicated because the sanction would impact private utility
in a nonlinear fashion. Hence, another reason for focussing on sanctions in terms of foregone leisure is that
it keeps our analysis transparent.
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system does not completely eliminate the incentive problems associated with pos-
itive welfare benefits. In particular, workers must enjoy higher consumption levels
than the unemployed do (i.e., v(x(n)) ≥ u(n) > v(b) + γ¯ > v(b)) in order to induce
agents to look for a job. In particular, additional consumption must compensate a
worker for the costs of work effort and job search.
After a worker has found a job, (s)he has to determine work effort. The ex-post











where T˜ (z) denotes the tax schedule as a function of gross income z. We can write
T (n) = T˜ (z(n)), since type n chooses gross income z(n) in equilibrium. The enve-









1 − τ(n)) = 1
n
, (4)
where τ(n) = dT˜ (z)
dz
|z=z(n) denotes the marginal tax rate faced by agent n.
Since z(n) ≥ 0, incentive compatibility (3) implies that utilities do not decline with
skill (i.e., u′(n) ≥ 0). Accordingly, if the participation constraint
u(n) ≥ γ¯ + v(b) (5)
is satisfied for skill n¯, it is met also for all higher skills n > n¯. Defining nw as the
lowest skill level for which the participation constraint is met, we thus have s(n) = 0
for n < nw and s(n) = s¯ for n ≥ nw . The agents with skill n < nw can be viewed as
being voluntarily unemployed. The higher skills n > nw , in contrast, look for work
but may be involuntarily unemployed (if s¯ < 1).
The government does not observe workers’ skills n but knows the distribution
function f (n) and observes before-tax income of each individual z(n). Although the
government is not able to observe the skills of workers, it may be able to distin-
guish between the unemployed with lower skills n < nw and those unemployed with
higher skills n > nw . In particular, whereas the high-skilled agents n > nw who do
not engage in the maximum search activity s¯ are sanctioned with probability pc, non-
searching low-skilled agents n < nw receive a sanction with exogenous probability
p0, which may be lower than pc. The difference between these two probabilities,
μn ≡ pc − p0, thus captures the extent to which the government can observe the
skills of the unemployed and can therefore target sanctions at the more productive
agents. We assume p0 ≥ (1− s¯)ps , so that agents who do not search at all do not face
a lower (ex ante or unconditional) probability of being sanctioned than agents who
do search at maximum intensity.
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The inequality pc > p0 implies that the government is able to acquire some (albeit
imperfect) information about an agent’s type n. In particular, the government can
distinguish types n > nw from n < nw . This limits the extent to which the former
types can mimic the latter. This can lead to situations where types below nw are
better off in terms of overall utility than types slightly above nw without violating the
incentive compatibility constraint for type nw .
The government faces the following budget constraint:




(1 − s¯)[b −pszπ ] +E =
∫ n1
nw
f (n)s¯T (n)dn, (6)
where E represents exogenously given exhaustive government expenditure and
T (n) ≡ z(n) − x(n) denotes the tax paid by type n. Expression (6) allows us to
interpret the sanction system as productive workfare if zπ > 0. In particular, with
probability p0, a voluntarily unemployed person with skill n < nw (who thus does
not search) is forced to engage in workfare and produce zπ for the public sector4
by giving up leisure π . An involuntarily unemployed person (who does engage in
search s = s¯) is put on workfare with probability ps . In order to focus our analysis
on optimal tax-transfer policies, we take the monitoring and sanction system to be
exogenous and do not model the costs of monitoring.5
The utilitarian government maximizes ex-ante expected utility (i.e., expected util-
ity before the skill level and labor market status have been revealed) subject to the
incentive compatibility constraint (3), the participation constraint (1), and the govern-
ment budget constraint (6). In addition, labor supply and therefore before-tax income
should be non-negative (i.e., z(n) ≥ 0), while the second-order conditions for the
agents’ optimal choice of consumption and gross income imply that consumption
and gross income are non-decreasing in type n (i.e., z′(n) ≥ 0 and x′(n) ≥ 0; see,
for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). As in Boone and Bovenberg (2004), we
assume that these constraints are not binding (except for the unemployed who feature
zero gross income).
By employing u(n) as state variable (instead of x(n)) to facilitate the inclusion
of incentive compatibility (3) into the optimization problem, we can formulate the





v(b) − p0(π − εf )
]















4However, the government may have to provide people on workfare with certain tools, while only little or
no monetary revenue is generated. If forcing people to give up leisure in this way is costly, then zπ < 0.
5In order to come up with results on the optimal monitoring technology, we would have to estimate the
costs of monitoring, which is beyond the scope of the present paper. See Boone et al. (2007) for a cali-
bration of the costs and benefits of introducing monitoring and sanctions in a setting without distortionary
redistributive taxation.
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− λE
{








γ¯ − u(nw) + v(b)
)
, (7)
where T (n) ≡ z(n)−x(n) = z(n)−v−1(u(n)+ z(n)
n
). λu(n) represents the Lagrange
multiplier of the incentive compatibility constraint, λE stands for the multiplier of
the government budget constraint, and ηw denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the
participation constraint for type nw .
The job externality ε ≥ 0 represents the value of working in the private sector
beyond the production value of the job. εf denotes the external effect associated
with workfare jobs, which may differ from the external effect of a regular job in
the private sector. We included these external benefits of work because they play an
important role in the public policy debates on stimulating low-skilled workers to seek
employment. These external effects can be justified on several grounds. First of all,
social problems (such as crime) are often associated with unemployment. Second,
social norms such as the work ethic are eroded if more people collect unemployment
benefits (see Lindbeck et al. 1999). Third, unemployment may not only hurt social
capital but also lead to the obsolescence of human capital. Depreciation of human
and social capital may harm public finances in the future by reducing tax revenues
and raising public spending on welfare. It also damages private welfare directly if
decision makers are myopic, for example, on account of hyperbolic discounting. This
holds true even if current inactivity does not impact social norms but affects only
preferences of the individual concerned.
In our setting, the government faces two reasons why it would like to sanction
the voluntary unemployed. The first reason is a standard fiscal externality: a worker
generates tax revenue while an unemployed person collects a public welfare benefit b.
The second reason is the work externality. The government, however, does not like
everyone to work (nw = n0) even if monitoring of search activity would be perfect
or if the government could perfectly observe skills n. Only those types should search
for work who through their productivity and external benefits recoup the search cost
γ > 0. With imperfectly observable skills, it may be optimal to put people out of
work also to reduce the informational rent for higher skills types n > nw .
3 Optimal taxes and welfare benefits
This section characterizes the optimal tax and benefit system. In particular, the fol-
lowing lemma characterizes the solution for the optimal policy problem.
Lemma 1 If n0f (n0) < 1 − s¯, the optimal values for the consumption level of the
marginal worker, xw = x(nw), the skill of the marginal worker, nw , the welfare bene-
fit, b, and the shadow value of the government budget constraint, λE , are determined
by
v′(xw) = v(xw) − v(b) − γ¯
xw − b − ρ , (8)
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where ρ ≡ ε
λE







− π(pc − p0)
λEs¯
, (9)










+ s¯[G(n1) − G(nw)], (11)






























tf (t) − [1 − F(t)]]v(x(t)) − x(t)f (t)}dt, (12)




) = f (n)
nf (n) − (1 − F(n)) + G(n1)−G(n)
λE
. (13)
This solution features ηw > 0, nw > n0, v′(b) > λE , and τ(n) > 0 for n ≥ nw .
We focus on the case in which n0f (n0) < 1− s¯. The right-hand side of the inequal-
ity n0f (n0) < 1 − s¯ stands for involuntary unemployment among the skills that are
actively searching for a job. Hence, if these labor-market imperfections as measured
by this involuntary unemployment 1 − s¯ are substantial, voluntary unemployment
(i.e., nw > n0 so that the least skilled do not look for a job) becomes optimal. Intu-
itively, to avoid poverty among the substantial numbers of involuntarily unemployed,
the government sets the welfare level b at such a high level that the participation
constraint becomes binding and the least skilled workers no longer search for work,
especially if these workers feature only low labor productivity (i.e., n0 is small) and
account for a relatively small share of the labor force (i.e., f (n0) is small). The desire
to combat poverty among the low skilled and the involuntarily unemployed agents
thus optimally creates additional, voluntary unemployment.6
Expression (8) (together with (13)) determining the marginal type searching for a
job, nw , can be written in terms of the tax distortion on the intensive margin τ(nw)
and the tax and benefit distortion on the extensive margin, T (nw)+ b (using v(xw)−
v(b) − γ¯ = z(nw)/nw , v′(xw) = 1nw(1−τ(nw)) , and x(nw) = z(nw) − T (nw)):
τ(nw)z(nw) = T (nw) + b + ρ. (14)
6Indeed, the left-hand side of the inequality n0f (n0) < 1 − s¯ captures the efficiency costs of generous
welfare benefits putting the lowest skill out of work, while the right-hand side represents the distributional
benefits in terms of more consumption for the involuntarily unemployed.
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This expression balancing distortions on the extensive and intensive margins of la-
bor supply is similar to the corresponding expression in Boone and Bovenberg (2004)
except for the additional term ρ involving job externalities and the monitoring and
sanction technology. We thus discuss the impact of this latter term, starting with pos-
itive externalities on account of work in the private sector (but with εf = zπ = 0,
and pc = p0) so that ρ = ελE > 0. In that case, ceteris paribus the gross replace-
ment rate b
z(nw)
, the gap between the marginal and average tax rates widens at the
minimum productivity level, thereby making the tax system more progressive at this
skill level. Intuitively, with positive employment externalities, the government wants
to subsidize the job search of unskilled workers (i.e., labor supply on the extensive
margin) in order to reap more of these externalities by encouraging more workers to
pursue paid employment in the private sector. These subsidies are financed by higher
skilled agents so that the tax system becomes more progressive. An alternative way
to understand why employment externalities make the tax system more progressive
is that positive employment externalities can be viewed as implicit taxes on search.
With a larger overall tax wedge on search T (nw) + b + ρ, the optimal trade-off be-
tween distortions on the intensive and extensive margins demands that the explicit
tax on search (i.e., the extensive margin) is reduced and that the tax on effort (i.e., the
intensive margin) is raised.
In case of workfare for agents who have not found a job in the private sector,
not only searching for a job in the private sector but also refraining from search and
relying on workfare gives rise to positive externalities (if zπ + εfλE > 0).7 The net




)(zπ + εfλE ).8 By decreasing
these net externalities, workfare thus reduces the need to decrease the explicit tax
wedge on search T (nw) + b compared to the taxes on the intensive margin τ(nw).
If the government imposes more substantial sanctions on the higher skilled indi-
viduals who are supposed to search for a job (but do not) than on other non-searching
skills (i.e., π(pc − p0) > 0 with zπ = εf = 0), it can rely less on the tax system
to redistribute consumption across skills. Hence, ceteris paribus the gross replace-
ment rate b
z(nw)
, taxes on labor income become less progressive as the gap between
marginal and average tax rates narrows at the minimum productivity level. Intuitively,
the government can afford to levy a higher tax wedge T (nw) on marginal work-
ers without discouraging these agents from seeking work and without hurting lower
skilled agents. By observing the skills of the unemployed, the government thus can
redistribute consumption across skills while imposing fewer distortions on the search
margin. Whereas positive employment externalities can be viewed as an implicit tax
on search, the penalty system works as an implicit subsidy on search. The lower over-
all tax wedge on the search margin as a result of sanctions allows for a larger explicit
tax wedge on search T (nw) + b and a smaller wedge on the intensive margin of la-
bor supply τ(nw). Compared to positive employment externalities (which increase
7Since p0 − (1 − s¯)ps > 0, the voluntarily unemployed (who do not search) face a higher probability of
being put on workfare than those agents who actively search for a job in the private sector but may not find
one.
8The externalities ε and εf are divided by λE to transform utilities in commodities (or government rev-
enue).
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the overall distortionary tax wedge on the extensive margin), targeted sanctions thus
exert exactly the opposite effect by decreasing the overall tax wedge T (nw) + b + ρ
and making the tax system less progressive.
The monitoring system allows the government to alleviate the distortions on the
search margin imposed by a welfare system that protects the consumption level of
the least productive agents (n < nw).9 In particular, by targeting sanctions at non-
searching high productivity types, the government can provide a lower effective
income to these types compared to the effective welfare incomes enjoyed by non-
searching low-skilled types. By differentiating its instruments in this way, the gov-
ernment can redistribute from the high skilled to the low skilled with smaller distor-
tions on the search margin. The intuition for the term b − π(pc−p0)
λEs¯
(where we focus
on the part of the ρ term that involves the monitoring and sanction system) at the
right-hand side of (14) is as follows. If the government reduces nw , it would save
b − (1 − s¯)b = s¯b in terms of expenditure which is valued at λE . But the type that
would be drawn into work by the reduction in nw actually loses utility, as
s¯u(nw) − γ s¯ + (1 − s¯)
[
v(b) − psπ
] − (v(b) − p0π) = −(pc − p0)π < 0,
where we have used the participation constraint u(nw) = v(b) + γ¯ . As long as
bλEs¯ > π(pc − p0),10 the welfare system distorts search and the tax system is pro-
gressive at the minimum productivity level (i.e., the marginal tax rate exceeds the
average tax rate at this skill, so that τ(nw) > T (nw)z(nw) in order to protect search incen-
tives. Intuitively, sanctions are not strong enough to completely offset the distortions
imposed by the benefit system on the search margin. Accordingly, the tax system
is used to limit these search distortions through a relatively low average tax rate on
marginal workers (i.e., T (nw)
z(nw)
< τ(nw)).
To conclude our discussion of (14), we note that the term ρ captures the additional
welfare effects of raising employment (by reducing nw so that more skills search
for private employment) beyond the direct budgetary implications of not having to
pay a welfare benefit b and collecting additional tax revenue T (nw).11 In particular,
raising private employment generates additional externalities (if ε > 0), reduces the
externalities and public revenues associated with workfare (if zπ + εfλE > 0 and p0 −
(1 − s¯)ps > 0), and depresses private welfare of the additional searching agents who
are more heavily penalized if they do not search (if π(pc − p0) > 0 so that more
people face the threat of more serious penalties if they refrain from search).12
Equation (10) is the first order condition for optimal b. The left-hand side of this
expression represents the direct marginal benefits of more generous unemployment
compensation in terms of a higher utility level of the unemployed (υ). The right-
hand side stands for the marginal social costs, which consist of the direct marginal
9Whereas we model the benefits of monitoring, we do not specify the costs of monitoring. We thus cannot
compute optimal monitoring levels.
10This implies that b + ρ > 0, assuming that ελE − (
p0−(1−s¯)ps
s¯
)(zπ + εfλE ) ≥ 0.
11ρ includes the budgetary effect of the revenues from workfare zπ .
12As mentioned, this condition π(pc − p0) > 0 implies that non-searching skills just below nw enjoy
higher ex-ante levels of welfare than the marginal searching skill nw . However, γ¯ > 0 implies that workers
enjoy higher consumption levels than the unemployed do (i.e., v(x(n)) ≥ u(n) > v(b) + γ¯ > v(b)).
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resource costs of public spending λE (the first term) and the adverse impact on search
incentives of the marginal worker nw (the second term featuring the shadow value of
the participation constraint of the marginal worker ηw).
Equation (11) shows that with optimally set welfare benefits, the government can
raise revenues by adjusting taxes and benefits in such a way that marginal incentives
on neither the intensive nor the extensive margin are affected. In particular, raising
one additional euro from each worker induces all workers to work harder so as to
raise their gross incomes by one euro and thereby maintain their net incomes (and
thus their consumption levels). By at the same time reducing b so that utility of the
unemployed falls by the same amount as that of marginal workers nw , the govern-
ment prevents behavioral responses on the extensive margin.13 By adjusting taxes
and the welfare benefit in this fashion, the government eliminates behavioral effects
on the government budget constraint. The left-hand side of (11) represents the direct
positive impact on the government budget constraint: the first term stands for the im-
pact of lower welfare benefits for the unemployed (who represent a share υ of the
population), while the second term represents the revenues from the uniform tax on
workers (who account for a share (1 − υ) of the population). The right-hand side
of (11) denotes the cost of the additional revenues in terms of the private utilities of
both the unemployed (the first term) and the workers (the second term).14
























s¯f (n) dn = 0. (15)
The terms between square brackets can be interpreted as distributional wedges. The
weighted sum of these distributional wedges (with as weights the number of agents)
should be zero.
As explained above with n0f (n0) < 1 − s¯, it is optimal to have voluntary unem-
ployment (nw > n0). Although v′(b) > λE , it is not optimal for the government to
increase b because of the detrimental effect of higher welfare benefits on the partici-
pation constraint ηw > 0. Finally, all workers face positive marginal tax rates in order
to redistribute resources to agents with lower skills.
If we make an additional assumption, we can also show that the overall tax wedge
(including implicit taxes) on the extensive margin is strictly positive.
Lemma 2 Let x denote the minimal consumption level necessary to ensure an agent’s
participation: v(x) = γ¯ .15 If in addition to n0f (n0) < 1 − s¯ parameter values are
such that x ≥ ρ, we have b + T (nw) + ρ > 0, and z(n) > 0 for all n ≥ nw .
13In particular, all working agents raise production by the same amount dz > 0. In order to leave unaffected
the participation margin v(b)+ γ¯ = v(xw)− zw/nw , the government reduces the welfare benefit b so that
v′(b) db = − 1nw dz, or equivalently, db/dz = −1/(nwv′(b)).
14The utility cost is lowest for the highest skills because these skills need to exert the least effort to generate
an additional euro of gross income.
15At this consumption level x, a marginal type nw participates only if z(nw) = 0 and b = 0.
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Intuitively, if search costs are large (so that x is large) compared to the non-revenue
external effects of employment ρ, low-skilled workers should not search for non-
productive jobs (i.e., jobs with z(n) = 0). With marginal workers nw in productive
work, a positive marginal tax rate τ(nw) > 0 distorts the intensive margin of these
workers. In order to contain these distortions on the intensive margin, the government
optimally taxes on the extensive margin (i.e., b + T (nw) + ρ > 0 and τ(n) > 0 for
n ≥ nw). Indeed, b + T (nw) + ρ can be viewed as the marginal first-order welfare
gain from putting the marginal skill to work. It is in fact the implicit tax wedge on
the participation margin. Non-revenue externalities from work ρ 
= 0 may cause this
implicit tax wedge to differ from the explicit tax wedge resulting from the tax and
benefit system b + T (nw).
Another way to understand why the government imposes a positive implicit tax on
search (i.e., b + T (nw) + ρ > 0) is that welfare benefits rather than in-work benefits
are the most effective way to reach the poor (i.e., those suffering from a low con-
sumption level) for two reasons. First, with involuntary unemployment, in contrast to
in-work benefits, welfare benefits reach the involuntarily unemployed who are worse
off than workers. Second, with positive search costs, welfare benefits help low-skilled
agents without these agents having to engage in costly search. In-work benefits are
thus relatively costly ways to address poverty if search is ineffective (so that s¯ is small
and therefore n0f (n0) < 1 − s¯) and costly (compared to positive job externalities, so
that x ≥ ρ).
4 Job externalities
This section considers the effects of a government changing its valuation of the exter-
nal effects of employment. We explore external effects ε of jobs in the private sector
and of workfare εf .16 We find that higher ε (or a better appreciation by governments
of external effects like ε) can explain why many countries have introduced EITC type
of tax measures.
Conducting comparative statics on the solution characterized in Lemma 1 is not
trivial. The key to make this tractable is shown in Fig. 1. We first explain this figure
for the case in which b is exogenously fixed. Subsequently, we show that we can
generalize the results to the case in which b is endogenously determined by (11).
Figure 1 shows two relationships in (nw,λE) space. The Labor Supply curve (LS)
depicts the combinations of nw and λE that satisfy (8) and (13) for n = nw . As in
Boone and Bovenberg (2004), the LS curve is upward sloping. Intuitively, by indi-
cating that government revenue has become scarcer, a large value for λE raises the
overall tax burden on workers, thereby harming the incentives to look for work and
thus increasing nw .
Equation (12) represents the Government Budget Constraint, GBC. We assume
that apart from revenue considerations the government features a preference for a
higher level of private employment (this corresponds to the assumption ρ∗ ≥ 0 in the
16The working paper version of this paper considers also the comparative statics with respect to the mon-
itoring technology pc,p0, and π .
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Fig. 1 The effects of a change
in ε and E on employment and
marginal cost of public funds
proposition below). Hence, employment is subsidized at the margin so that a higher
level of employment makes public revenues scarcer. A higher level of employment
(i.e., lower nw) thus goes together with a higher value for the shadow price of public
money λE . The downward sloping GBC formalizes this trade off between raising
employment (lower nw) and raising public revenues (lower λE).
Figure 1 shows two comparative static exercises, namely higher government
spending E and a higher external effect ε of work in the private sector. An increase
in government expenditure E does not affect the LS curve. The GBC curve shifts
up (for given nw) because a higher value for λE is needed to balance the budget if
government spending increases. Scarcer public money raises unemployment (higher
nw) because at the margin the government subsidizes employment. An increase in the
external effect ε of work in the private sector leaves the GBC curve unaffected but
shifts the LS curve to the left; for given value of λE , the government now prefers a
higher level of private employment (lower nw). In equilibrium, an increase in ε thus
reduces unemployment and raises λE .
To endogenize b in this analysis, we add a linearized version of (10):













> 0. Larger un-
employment (i.e., an increase in nw) raises the optimal welfare benefit. The reason is
that more people rely on the welfare benefit for their livelihood if unemployment is
substantial, so that the distributional benefits of more generous welfare benefits are
larger. A larger value for λE raises the budgetary costs of public spending on welfare
benefits and thus reduces the optimal welfare benefit.
To derive the LS and GBC curves with endogenous b we rely on three regularity
conditions, namely assumptions 2–4 in the proposition below (the proof of Proposi-
tion 1 provides the corresponding formal conditions). We discuss these conditions in
turn.
With exogenous b, an increase in nw raises xw (through (13) with v′(xw) =
v′(x(nw))) so that the right-hand side of (8) increases relative to the left-hand side.
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With endogenous b, (16) shows that an increase in nw raises b which works in the
opposite direction. The first regularity condition implies that the former effect domi-
nates the latter.
Turning to the second regularity condition, we note that an increase in λE raises
the left-hand side of (8) relative to the right-hand side if b is exogenous. With endoge-
nous b, however, an increase in λE reduces b (see (16)) which works in the opposite
direction. The former effect dominates the latter if the second regularity condition is
met. These first two assumptions ensure that the LS curve is upward sloping if b is
endogenous.
As regards the last regularity condition, we observe that an increase in nw raises
government revenues if b is exogenous because employment is subsidized at the mar-
gin. However, as nw increases, unemployment rises which induces the government
to raise b (see (16)), thereby reducing net government revenues. The final regularity
condition implies that the latter effect is not strong enough to dominate the former ef-
fect. With an increase in λE raising government revenues (this effect is strengthened
with endogenous b), the GBC curve is therefore unambiguously downward sloping.
Proposition 1 Consider the case in which b is endogenously determined by (10). We
make the following four assumptions:
1. ρ∗ ≡ ε − εf (p0 − (1 − s¯)ps)/s¯ − π(pc − p0)/s¯ ≥ 0;
2. An (exogenous) increase in nw raises the right-hand side of (8) relative to its left-
hand side;
3. An (exogenous) increase in λE raises the left-hand side of (8) relative to its right-
hand side;
4. An (exogenous) increase in nw increases the government’s budget surplus (or
equivalently, reduces the deficit).








The government attributing a larger external effect to people working in the private












> 0 for n ≥ nw.













< 0 for n ≥ nw.
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Assumption 1 that ρ∗ ≥ 0 formalizes the idea that apart from revenue consider-
ations the government exhibits a preference for higher private employment. As dis-
cussed above, this is a sufficient condition for the GBC curve to be downward sloping
with exogenous b.
External effects from work We first consider the impact of a larger external effect
ε of work in the private sector. In Fig. 1, this leaves the GBC unaffected, but shifts
the LS curve to the left. Hence, nw declines. Moreover, as λE goes up, the marginal
tax rates on all working types n ∈ 〈nw,n1〉 increase. The economic intuition behind
these impacts is that a larger external effect of private employment induces the gov-
ernment to encourage more agents to search (so that nw declines). Improved search
incentives for marginal workers require a tax cut for the marginal skills around nw .
The associated loss in tax revenue implies that skilled agents have to bear a higher
tax burden. The shift of the burden of the labor tax away from low-skilled workers
towards skilled workers raises marginal tax rates for all workers. A better apprecia-
tion of these external effects ε by governments can thus explain the introduction of
EITC type of tax measures in many countries.
Equation (16) implies that the decline in nw and the increase in λE reduce b.
Hence, higher externalities ε lead to lower benefits b as the government relies more
on in-work benefits than on welfare benefits to alleviate poverty.
External effects from workfare Additional external effects from workfare εf yield
the opposite effects of additional external effects from work in the private sector.
With more external effects of workfare, the government perceives less need to induce
agents to look for work in the private sector through low labor taxes on marginal
skills. Hence, the government raises the tax burden on marginal skills, thereby de-
pressing private-sector employment. Moreover, marginal tax rates on workers decline
as the tax burden is shifted away from high-skilled to low-skilled workers. Finally, it
follows from (16) that this leads to higher benefits b.
5 Conclusions
This paper explored how tax policy, welfare benefits, job externalities and the technol-
ogy for monitoring and sanctioning inadequate search interact in a model of optimal
nonlinear income taxation with search costs and involuntary unemployment. Within
this setting, optimal unemployment is determined by the requirement that distortions
on the extensive margin balance those on the intensive margin. We show how sanc-
tions on inadequate search, workfare, and externalities from work affect this require-
ment. Among other things, we find that job externalities reduce the optimal welfare
benefit and raise marginal tax rates on work effort. These marginal tax rates are re-
duced, however, by workfare. Whereas workfare can be seen as a substitute for an
EITC, job externalities make an EITC more attractive.
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Appendix: Proofs of the results
Proof of Lemma 1 Equation (7) is an optimal control problem where z(n) is the
control, u(n) is the state variable, and nw is a lower bound that is chosen optimally.
The first-order conditions for this problem can be written as follows:17
















λu(nw) + ηw = 0, (19)
λu(n1) = 0, (20)
v(b) − p0(π − εf ) − s¯(ε − γ ) + (1 − s¯)ps(π − εf ) − (1 − s¯)v(b) − s¯u(nw)
− λEs¯T (nw) − λE
[




u′(nw) = 0. (21)
The first order condition for b is given by (10).





1 − τ(n)) = 1
n
. (22)
Substitution of (22) into (18) yields
τ(n) = − λu(n)
λEn2f (n)s¯
. (23)




Substituting (18) into (17) to eliminate v′(x(n)), we arrive at a linear differential
equation in λu(n) which is given by ( λu(n)n )





1 − F(n)) − (G(n1) − G(n))]. (25)
17The optimality (or transversality) condition for the bound nw can be found in texts like Kamien and
Schwartz (1981).
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Substitution of (25) into (18) to eliminate λu(n) yields (13). Substituting (19)






) − (G(n1) − G(nw))]. (26)
Combining (26) with (10) yields (11).
An alternative expression for λE can be derived by evaluating (13) at n = nw:
λE = G(n1) − G(nw)
1 − F(nw) − nwf (nw) + f (nw)v′(xw)
. (27)
Substitution of the participation constraint u(nw) = γ + v(b) − pc−(1−s¯)pss¯ π
into (21) yields
ηwu
′(nw) = f (nw)
{
−π(pc − p0) + λEs¯
(
T (nw) + b
)
+ s¯ε − λE
(






Using (24) to eliminate ηw and (3) to eliminate u′(nw), we can rewrite the left-
hand side of this equation to obtain (using the definition of ρ from (9))
τ(nw)z(nw) = T (nw) + b + ρ. (28)
Substitution of (4) and T (n) = z(n) − x(n) for n = nw to eliminate τ(nw) and
T (nw) and z(nw) = nw(v(xw)−u(nw)) = nw(v(xw)− v(b)− γ¯ ) to eliminate z(nw)
yields (8) in the lemma.
Substituting z(n) = n(v(x(n)) − u(n)) in (3) to eliminate z(n), we arrive at the
differential equation (nu(n))′ = v(x(n)). With the participation constraint u(nw) =















Substitution of T (n) = z(n)− x(n) = nv(x(n))−nu(n)− x(n) to eliminate T (n)


































Rearranging and changing the order of integration results in (12).
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First, we prove that ηw > 0. Suppose by contradiction that ηw ≤ 0. Then (31) im-
plies that λE ≥ v′(b). The participation constraint v(x(n)) − z(n)n ≥ v(b) + γ¯ where
z(n) ≥ 0 and γ¯ > 0 implies that x(n) > b for all n ≥ nw . Concavity of v(x) then im-
plies that λE ≥ v′(b) > v′(x(n)) for all n so that (from (17)) λ′u(n) > 0 for all n ≥ nw .
Since λu(nw) = −ηw ≥ 0, this contradicts λu(n1) = 0. Hence, we have shown that
ηw > 0 and (from (31)) v′(b) > λE .
Equation (26) and ηw > 0 imply that
λE >
G(n1) − G(nw)
1 − F(nw) >
G(n1) − G(n)
1 − F(n) (32)
for all n > nw . Equation (25) then implies that λu(n) < 0 so that (see (23)) τ(n) > 0
for all n ≥ nw .
Next, we show that s¯ < 1 − n0f (n0) implies that nw > n0. Suppose by contradic-









which can be rewritten as
v′(b) = λE
1 − s¯1−s¯ n0(λE − G(n1))
.




) = f (n0)
n0f (n0) − 1 + G(n1)λE
.
To prove the result, we will show that s¯ < 1 − n0f (n0) implies v′(b) < v′(x(n0))
and thus (with concavity of v(x)) x(n0) < b, which contradicts the participation con-
straint v(x(n0)) − z(n0)n0 ≥ v(b) + γ¯ where z(n0) ≥ 0 and γ¯ > 0. Since (32) implies
λE > G(n1) (recall that nw = n0), we must prove that
v′(b) = λE




) = f (n0)
n0f (n0) − 1 + G(n1)λE
for all λE > G(n1). This inequality can be rewritten as




1 − s¯ n0f (n0) − 1
)
.
For λE = G(n1), the right-hand side of this equation is 0, while the left-hand side
is strictly positive at λE = G(n1) because G(n1) < 1n0 . Accordingly, a necessary and
sufficient condition for the inequality to hold for all λE > G(n1) is that the right-hand
side is more strongly downward sloping in λE than the left-hand side so that
s¯
1 − s¯ n0f (n0) − 1 < −n0f (n0),
Optimal taxation and welfare benefits with monitoring of job search 287
or equivalently,
s¯ < 1 − n0f (n0),
which holds by assumption. 
Proof of Lemma 2 We show that x ≥ ρ implies z(nw) > 0. The second-order condi-
tion of the agent’s optimization problem z′(n) ≥ 0 then implies that z(n) > 0 for all
n ≥ nw . Suppose by contradiction that z(nw) = 0. The participation constraint and
(28) (with T (nw) = −x(nw)) since z(nw) = 0) imply that
v(xw) = v(b) + γ¯ , (34)
xw = b + ρ. (35)
Both curves can be drawn in the (b, xw) space. By our assumption x > ρ, curve (34)
lies above (35) at b = 0. v′(b)
v′(xw) > 1 (since xw > b by the participation constraint)
implies that the curve (34) is steeper than (35). The two curves thus do not intersect,
and (34) and (35) cannot hold simultaneously. This rules out z(nw) = 0.
(28) and z(nw) > 0 and τ(nw) > 0 (see (24) with ηw > 0) imply that T (nw)+ b+
ρ > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 1 We derive the proof of this result in two steps. First, we show
that the result holds for exogenous b. Then we derive that the result generalizes to the
case with endogenous b.
Exogenous b: Linearizing (8) and (27), we derive the slope of the LS curve:(









































 = −ζnwv′′(xw)(xw − b − ρ) < 0.
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(−ε + εf (p0 + (1 − s¯)ps)/s¯ + (π(pc − p0))/s¯) (from










(xw − b − ρ)(−ζnw)
> 0 (40)
where ζλE > 0 and ζnw ≤ 0 are given by (38) and (37) and ρ∗ ≥ 0 by assumption 1.
Linearizing the government budget constraint (12), we establish




dγ¯ + dE − (F(nw)p0







(1 − s¯) dps
)
, (41)








(−v(xw) + v(b) + γ¯ )
+ s¯f (nw)
(
xw − b + zπ p0 − (1 − s¯)ps
s¯
)
= (xw − b − ρ)
[
−[f (nw)nw − (1 − F(nw))]s¯ v(xw) − v(b) − γ¯












xw − b − ρ
)]










































dn > 0, (43)
so that dnw/dλE = −φλE/φnw < 0. 






so that the GBC curve shifts to the right. Hence, an increase in E raises both nw and
λE .
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With a fixed GBC curve, an increase in ε raises λE and reduces nw . Equation (39)
then implies that dxw/dε < 0. Equations (13) and (4) (with ∂λE∂ε > 0) then imply that
marginal tax rates go up for all n > nw . Writing T (n) as follows (where the second
equality follows from z(n) = n(v(x(n)) − u(n)) and (29))
T (n) = z(n) − x(n) (44)



































At n = nw , only the negative effects remain:
dT (n)
dε







v(xw) − v(b) − γ¯
)
< 0,
where nwv′(x(nw)) − 1 > 0 and v(xw)− v(b)− γ¯ > 0, so that dT (n)dε < 0 for n close






v(xw) − v(b) − γ¯










At the margin, a decline in nw drains the government budget. This effect working in
the direction of dT (n)
dε
> 0 is strongest for high values of n because the integral at the
right-hand side of the equation above increases with n (in absolute value).
A rise in εf exerts the same qualitative effects as a decline in ε.
We now show that these results can be generalized to the case with endogenous b.
Endogenous b: With endogenous b, (8) and (27) are linearized as follows:





= dγ¯ + v′(xw)dρ,
v′′(xw)dxw − ζnw dnw = ζλE dλE,
where ζnw ≤ 0 and ζλE > 0 are defined in (37) and (38).












290 J. Boone, L. Bovenberg
where the matrix A is defined as follows:
⎛





det(A) = (xw − b − ρ)
(
v′′(xw)
)(−ζnw − αnw v′(b) − v′(xw)xw − b − ρ
)
, (48)
where xw − b − ρ > 0, v′′(xw) < 0. To find the sign of det(A), we use assumption
2 in the proposition. Fix λE , then the first equation of the linearized system can be
written as
v′′(xw)(xw − b − ρ) ∂xw
∂nw
+ (v′(b) − v′(xw)) ∂b
∂nw
< 0
where the inequality follows from assumption 2. Using the second and third equation






αnw . Substituting this into the inequality above shows that
−ζnw − αnw
v′(b) − v′(xw)
xw − b − ρ > 0, (49)
and therefore det(A) < 0 in (48).




























where ζb ≡ v′(b)−v′(xw)xw−b−ρ > 0. The denominator is positive due to (49). With a similar
argument as above, one can show that assumption 3 in the proposition implies that
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Combining the linearized government budget constraint (12) with (16), we obtain:⎛



















v′(b) + s¯F (nw) + 1 − s¯ > 0. (51)




= −φλE + αλEφb
φnw − φbαnw
, (52)
where αλE ,φλE ,φb > 0 (given by expressions (42), (43), and (51)) imply that the
numerator of the fraction on the right-hand side is positive. With similar arguments as
above (using assumptions 2 and 3), one can show that assumption 4 in the proposition




Hence, with endogenous b, we also have an upward sloping LS curve and down-
ward sloping GBC curve. To finish the proof, we show that ρ (and hence ε and εf )
shifts LS in the same direction under endogenous and exogenous b.
The expression for | ∂nw
∂ρ













ζnw+αnw ζb > 0, the derivative
∂nw
∂ρ
has the same sign under endogenous and
exogenous b.
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